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Important News, Belangrijke nieuws, Nouvelles importantes, Wichtige News, Fontos hírek, Importanti novitŕ, Pomembne novice, Importante Notícias, Viktiga nyheter

Ing. Salih CAVKIC
orbus editor in chief

Belang van Limburg
De Morgen
De Standard
Het Laatste Nieuws
La Libre Belgique


Deutsche Welle
West-D. Zeitung

The man of the year

Guy Verhofstadt
Mr. Guy Verhofstadt

The man of the year
L'homme de l'an
De man van het jaar

A proven Democrat, protector and fighter for justice and human rights in the World.

Een bewezen Democraat, beschermer en strijder voor rechtvaardigheid en mensenrechten in de Wereld.

Un prouvé démocrate, protecteur et combattant pour la justice et des droits de l'homme dans le Mond.

Eine bewährte Demokrat, Beschützer und Kämpfer für Gerechtigkeit und Menschenrechte in der Welt.

Dokazani demokrat,
 zaštitnik i borac za pravdu i ljudska prava u Svijetu.

Peace in the World

Mr. Barak Hossein Obama

peace in the world

vrede in de wereld

la paix dans le monde

Garantie des Friedens in der Welt

mieru vo svete

mira u svijetu

Perpetual Self conflict: Self awareness as a key to our ethical drive, personal mastery, and perception of entrepreneurial opportunities.
Murray Hunter

Go Home, Occupy Movement!! - (The McFB – Was Ist Das?) -
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

Diplomatie préventive - Aucun sičcle Asiatique sans l’institution pan-Asiatique - prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

The Continuum of Psychotic Organisational Typologies
Murray Hunter

There is no such person as an entrepreneur, just a person who acts entrepreneurially
Murray Hunter

Groupthink may still be a hazard to your organization - Murray Hunter

Generational Attitudes and Behaviour - Murray Hunter

The environment as a multi-dimensional system: Taking off your rose coloured glasses - Murray Hunter

Imagination may be more important than knowledge: The eight types of imagination we use - Murray Hunter

Do we have a creative intelligence? - Murray Hunter

Not all opportunities are the same: A look at the four types of entrepreneurial opportunity - Murray Hunter

   The Evolution of Business Strategy - Murray Hunter

How motivation really works - Murray Hunter

Evaluating Entrepreneurial Opportunities: What’s wrong with SWOT? - Murray Hunter

 The five types of thinking we use - Murray Hunter

Where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from? - Murray Hunter

  How we create new ideas - Murray Hunter

How emotions influence, how we see the world? - Murray Hunter



World Security Network reporting from Washington D.C. in USA , March 22, 2012

Dear Cavkic Salih,

The President of the Federal Republic of Germany Joachim Gauck (2011)

"Often labeled as a maverick, Joachim Gauck can look back at a successful career since the reunification. A spokesperson for the East German New Forum during the peaceful revolution of 1989, he was elected to the last Parliament of the GDR on the list of Alliance 90, a democratic union of opposition movements. He was nominated Special Representative for the Stasi archives and later confirmed by the federal government of the Federal Republic of Germany for this position."

Germany has elected its 11th president: Joachim Gauck (72), a Lutheran pastor and internationally renowned human rights activist. The position of President of the Federal Republic of Germany is merely ceremonial, but several German presidents have used it as a bully pulpit over the past decades.

The new German president became known to the public in 1990 as the principal custodian of the German Secret Police (Stasi) archives, a position he left in 2000. His impact was such that Germans soon associated his name with the Office of the Custodian, which became known as the Gauck Behoerde.

Gauck, whose father had been arrested by the Soviet security services on fabricated charges of spying and came back from a Siberian gulag crippled, has been raised in a deeply anti-Communist family. Although he was often advised to escape to West Germany in his younger years, he deliberately chose to remain in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) in order to confront the communist regime.

Branded an “incorrigible anti-Communist” as a student and later as a pastor, he was closely monitored by the Stasi. After repeatedly preaching about individual responsibility and freedom and criticizing East German totalitarianism during his Sunday masses, his situation considerably worsened. His children were barred from going to college.

Several attempts to force Gauck to cooperate with the Stasi failed, and he eventually became the victim of systematic smear campaigns by the GDR’s secret police. These campaigns have been carried on against him by the German far-left press ever since and recently reappeared in social media.

Often labeled as a maverick, Gauck can look back at a successful career since the reunification. A spokesperson for the East German New Forum during the peaceful revolution of 1989, he was elected to the last Parliament of the GDR on the list of Alliance 90, a democratic union of opposition movements. He was nominated Special Representative for the Stasi archives and later confirmed by the federal government of the Federal Republic of Germany for this position.

Author of numerous books, notably co-authoring Stephane Courtois’ Black Book of Communism, Germany’s most prominent political activist has been a guiding light for many countries confronted with the problem of lustration—exposure of the former communist functionaries and secret agents and banning them from government posts. Failure to undertake lustration caused ambiguous outcomes in many post-Soviet countries, including Russia and Ukraine.

In recent years, Joachim Gauck’s activism has been focused on the Foundation Against Oblivion and for Democracy, which he chairs.

The former pastor, who enjoys the highest rates of popularity among the German public, never joined any political party. Described as a Liberal-Conservative by the German press, he was picked as a presidential candidate by the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party in June 2010, after the resignation of President Koehler (CDU), but lost to Merkel’s candidate, Christian Wulff (CDU).

After Wulff himself was forced to resign in February over claims of various financial irregularities, it was Merkel’s coalition partner, the Free Democrat Party (FDP), which decided to unilaterally endorse Gauck, forcing Merkel to give in to avoid a greater coalition crisis.

Gauck, who is known for his Atlanticist views, is a member of the Atlantik Bruecke, which supports European–American dialogue and alliance, and he has also been a vocal advocate of a free-market economy. He criticized the “Occupy Movement” and the anti-capitalist debates for an “unspeakable daftness,” arguing that he “indeed had already lived in a country where banks were really occupied.”

Germany’s new president is also a co-signatory of the Prague Declaration on the Crimes of Communism.

Unlikely to stumble over a controversy regarding Afghanistan like one of his predecessors, Horst Koehler, and seemingly immune to personal attacks, he has clearly voiced his support for the military intervention in Afghanistan, which he views as a necessary fight against terrorism. In the eyes of German public opinion, it also helps that the mission in Afghanistan is backed by a U.N. mandate and therefore seen as justified. After incriminating reports of the Stasi Archives were leaked to WikiLeaks, Gauck strongly criticized that organization, calling it a clear violator of the law and a threat to society.

Germany’s new president is a man whose formative experience was the fight against communism. He has both a moral compass and a spine. He does not fear to address difficult issues, knowing where he stands and acting accordingly.

After the loss of Vaclav Havel, Europe might have found a successor and a reliable ally to perpetuate the freedom agenda and cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nathalie Vogel
Editor Eastern Europe
World Security Network Foundation

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ESI newsletter 2/2012
March 13, 2012

Dear friends of ESI,

Every year, hundreds of thousands of Turks queue in front of EU consulates, spending time and money in exchange for a chance to travel to the EU. In 2010, their number was 625,000. Often they receive a single-entry visa valid for only a few days. Sometimes they are denied entry outright.

The visa barrier erected around both the 26-country Schengen zone and the United Kingdom and Ireland is a source of intense frustration for Turkish citizens and officials. They are right to feel wronged: Turkey is the only EU candidate country without a visa-free travel regime with the EU. Even Moldova and Ukraine, which have yet to receive any promise of membership, participate in an EU visa liberalisation process. Other eastern neighbours are expected to follow suit. There are even discussions about visa-free travel for Russians. Mexicans, Brazilians, Guatemalans, Israelis and Malaysians can also all travel to the EU without a visa.

In 2008 the EU launched a visa liberalisation process for five Western Balkans states. Each received a "visa roadmap" which listed close to 50 specific and demanding conditions. The EU closely monitored progress at every step, sending many fact-finding missions to the field. But Balkan leaders had also received a clear promise that they would be treated fairly. They were. When they fulfilled the EU's conditions (ranging from passport security to improved border control to intensified police cooperation with the EU) in 2009 and 2010, the visa requirement was lifted.

Marinela Lika

Miki Bulatovic

Katarina Radic

Ermira Mehmeti

Marinela Lika
 Branko Bulatovic
Katarina Radic
Ermira Mehmeti

They can travel to the EU without visa

While Turks see Serbs, Albanians and Bosnians travel to the EU without a visa, the EU has refused to offer them even the perspective of a visa liberalisation process. At a February 2011 meeting, EU interior ministers only put an inconsequential "dialogue on visa, mobility and migration" on the table. A closed meeting of an EU working group on migration and frontiers (SCIFA) in February 2012 showed that the mood of the main EU member states has not changed since.

Many EU interior ministers believe that they stand no chance of convincing their electorates that visa-free travel for Turks is a safe bet. What if tens of thousands of Turks abuse visa-free travel, overstay and even take up illegal work? What if thousands apply for political asylum? Isn't visa liberalisation for Turks a reckless concession?

However, there are three major problems with the EU's current policy. First, it violates the EU's own legal commitments. Second, it undermines the bloc's vital security interests. Finally, it is based on mistaken assumptions. The EU's current visa policy towards Turkey is unsustainable, and the time to revise it is now.

A stream of court rulings

EU working groups often ignore that, when it comes to the visa issue, Turkish citizens already have legal rights inside the EU. In fact, these have already been upheld by no less an authority than the European Court of Justice, as well as many national courts. A stream of recent rulings has confirmed the Turks' right to travel to a number of EU member states, including Germany and the Netherlands, for up to three months without a visa. What flows from this is the conclusion that the current Schengen visa requirement, and the EU regulation on which it is based, are illegal.

Guler Sabanci


Orhan Pamuk

Unknown woman

Guler Sabanci Tarkan Orhan Pamuk Unknown woman

They need a visa: how much longer?

Few EU interior ministers will have heard about a court decision in the case of a Turkish national arrested by the German federal police at the country's border with the Czech Republic in August 2009. Even though the man had entered Germany without a visa in order to buy a car, a local court in the city of Cham ordered his immediate release, noting that as a Turkish national he could "rely on visa-free travel according to the so-called standstill clause." This refers to a protocol to the 1963 Association Agreement between the then EEC and Turkey, which states that both sides "shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services." When the protocol entered into force in January 1973, 11 of today's EU member states did not have a visa requirement for Turkish nationals. There is also consistent jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice (Gambelli 2003, paragraph 55) holding the view that in EU law the freedom to provide services covers persons providing services as well as persons receiving them.

In the past few years, European courts have often been called upon to defend the rights of Turkish citizens under this protocol. In February 2009 the European Court of Justice ruled that Turkish truck drivers Mehmet Soysal and Ibrahim Savatli, as service providers, did not need a visa to enter Germany. In 2009, Candan Erdogan, a businesswoman travelling from Los Angeles to Istanbul via Munich, missed her connecting flight. When German police did not allow her to leave the airport, she pressed charges and a court in Munich ruled in February 2011 that she "is permitted to enter the Federal Republic of Germany for a period of up to three months to receive services, especially for tourism purposes, without a residence permit and without a visa." In November 2 010, a Turkish tourist entering Germany from Poland without a visa was arrested for illegal immigration and sent to prison. A court in Hannover ruled in January 2011 that the man had to be set free, as he had not broken any laws. In February 2011 a pregnant Turkish woman was arrested in Bad Reichenhall after entering Germany from Austria. The regional court in Traunstein ordered the police to release her and to allow her to stay in Germany as a tourist for up to three months.

The authors of a June 2011 study by the scientific research service of the German Bundestag concluded that recent court decisions "have finally clarified that Turkish nationals may enter federal territory without a visa and reside there without a residence permit as long as they do not take up employment (passive freedom of services). Especially tourists are expected to benefit from this situation." The case of Leyla Demirkan, which is now dealt with by the European Court of Justice, is likely to make the same point even more clearly when it issues its ruling. Leyla Demirkan is a Turkish teenager who wanted to visit her sick stepfather, a German national who was hospitalised, and her (Turkish) mother in Stuttgart in 2007, and was denied a visa by Germany.

Why Greece, Bulgaria and the EU need Turkey

While the legal ramifications render the EU's current visa policy unsustainable, the security interests of the EU make it irrational. Today, the EU needs Turkey's full support in order to solve a range of burning problems of the Schengen zone, including illegal migration, the future of Greece in Schengen and the question of Schengen membership for Bulgaria and Romania.

The most pressing issue for the Schengen area is to secure Greece's border with Turkey. Last year, more than 61,000 illegal migrants were detected at the Turkish-Greek border. Human rights groups have repeatedly pointed to a major humanitarian crisis in Greece. The Justice and Home Affairs Council on 8 March mentioned that "Greece has experienced difficulties respecting the European minimum standards for receiving asylum applicants and examining their applications. This is linked to particular migratory pressure, particularly coming from Turkey."

Migrants being held in the Pagani detention center on the Greek island of Lesvos

Humanitarian crisis at the Greek border

Frontex, the EU's border agency, faces an enormous challenge. Left unresolved, the mass wave of migration may soon put Greek membership in the Schengen area at risk. Fears have also emerged that Bulgaria's and Romania's entry into Schengen could make it even easier for illegal migrants to fan out to the rest of the EU since both countries border Turkey.

The ratification and implementation of a readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey, on which EU interior ministers insist, will do little to allay the migration problem unless combined with other efforts by Turkey preventing illegal migrants from reaching Greek territory. A Greek-Turkish readmission agreement has already been in force since 2002. It has done very little to change the dynamic of illegal migration, and there is no reason to believe that an agreement with the EU would be any different.

They need turkish support: Frontex at Greek border

They need Turkish support: Frontex at Greek border

For Turkey to reform its border regime, work closely with Frontex and invest more resources into exit controls requires effort, good will and trust. Frontex officials told us that they are certain that serious Turkish efforts could quickly translate into a dramatic fall in illegal migration. However, Turkish officials make it clear that such cooperation requires being treated fairly by the EU on the issue of visa liberalisation. Turkey has, after all, many difficult borders which demand attention and resources.

Irrational Fears

What about European fears about the consequences of visa liberalisation? Most of the illegal migrants who are crossing into Greece are Afghanis, Algerians and Somalis – but no Turks. In recent years more Turks have left Germany in search of opportunities back home than the other way around. The prospect of large-scale Turkish migration to the EU is misplaced, as many recent studies have also shown.

A visa liberalisation roadmap for Turkey now

All this points towards an obvious conclusion. The European Commission should immediately offer Turkey a visa liberalisation roadmap similar to the one offered to EU candidate Macedonia and other Western Balkan states in 2008. In doing so it should not hide behind member states. This also does not require any decision by member states and could happen even before Cyprus takes over the EU presidency this summer.

Turkish officials should embark on a tour of European capitals explaining to their counterparts that a visa roadmap, and improved practical cooperation along the Greek-Turkish border, is in the interest of both sides. They should also stress sotto voce that an orderly visa liberalisation process is a better alternative to a scenario whereby visa-free travel is eventually imposed on EU member states by their own courts.

In exchange for a roadmap, Turkey should sign the readmission agreement with the EU whose content has already been negotiated, but which, by itself, will in any case change very little for either side. More importantly, Turkey should begin working with Frontex to reduce illegal migration into Greece. Here progress could be immediate and would be measurable.

Progress towards visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would create a win-win situation. Reforms necessitated by the roadmap process would improve the human rights situation in Turkey. The situation of illegal aliens, for one, would benefit from changes to Turkey's asylum system. Increased Turkish cooperation with Frontex would help Greece remain in Schengen and allow Bulgaria and Romania to join without further delay. EU-Turkey relations would improve. Visa-free travel would also be good for Turkish students and businesspeople, and tourism from Turkey could provide a boost to European economies, especially Greece.

Such a breakthrough would also send a powerful signal to Turkish officials and citizens that EU politicians actually mean it when they talk about respect for the rule of law, for court decisions and for international commitments. Such a signal is needed today. It is, in the end, a simple matter of common interests.

To find out more about this issue in the coming months, please bookmark the special ESI website section on EU-Turkey and visa issues.

With the support of Mercator Stiftung ESI also organised an event in Berlin recently, where Otto Schily, former German minister of Interior and member of the ESI Schengen White List advisory board called on German politicians, and his party, the SPD, to support visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens.

Best wishes,

Gerald Knaus

Gerald Knaus


Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chair IL&GPS

Recognizing its strategic opportunity and grasping its generational/historic responsibility, the OSCE backed by its MS should create the Task Force on The Future of Human Capital[1]. For this tomorrow that starts now, our common future holds us fully accountable today.


The Prodi and Barroso Commissions have both repeatedly stressed that:

“at present, some of our world trading partners compete with primary resources, which we in the EU/Europe do not have. Some compete with cheap labor, which we do not want. Some compete on the back of their environment, which we cannot accept.”

Ambitiously visioning Europe as the knowledge based-economy, the Commission’s instrument referred to as the Lisbon agenda links social and economic prosperity with the so-called knowledge triangle: research (creation of knowledge); development/innovation (application of knowledge); and education (dissemination of knowledge).

The recent EC memo (M.05/1999/090605 – Com. S & R) states “that for each extra percent in public R&D, there is an extra 0,17% growth in productivity. To put this into context, the average annual labor productivity growth in the Eurozone was 1,2% between 1995 and 2003. For every 0,1% increase in R&D intensity boosts output per capita growth by 0,3 – 0,4%.”

Finally, the memo claims that “an increased budget for European R&D could have a major impact on employment creating as many as 1 mil. jobs by 2030” by simply supporting future-oriented industries (such as the Bio-informatics, Space applications, Nano-technology and the like).

But we should ask: jobs for whom ?

The ongoing Lisbon mid term review debate is centered on a main principle: A resolute “no” to any trade-off between economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection.

Environmental protection surely includes preservation of biodiversity – meaning protection and promotion of LIFE – in all its forms.

This Lisbon ‘no-trade-off principle’ accommodates Europe’s development thinking close to the matrix of sustainable development which per definition formulates development (reaffirming its human in addition to the economic dimension) as any societal activity which meets the needs of the present, without compromising the needs of future generations (certainly deprived from any hidden environmental, social or health related costs).

Last week in Brussels, as a direct follow-up to the January 2005 JHA Green Paper, the EC Vice President Frattini and Commissioner Spidla jointly opened a public hearing.

As one of explanatories to enhance a public debate on subject, the EC memo (M.05/206/140605) reports the following:

Labour and skills shortages are already noticeable in a number of sectors and they will tend to increase. On 1 January 2003 migrants represented around 3.5% of the total population in the EU-25. In 2003 the total population increased by 1.9 million, mainly due to net migration of 1.7 million (STAT/04/105); Eurostat (STAT/05/48) estimates that “over the next two decades [2005-2025] the total population of the EU-25 is expected to increase by more than 13 million inhabitants […] mainly due to net migration, since total deaths in the EU-25 will outnumber total births from 2010.

These figures[2], meant as a supporting argument to the economic migrants admission initiative, cannot hide the tragic meaning of the STAT findings – which is that Europe will very soon (2010), and for the first time in its history---despite all eventual investments in R&D---be able to produce everything except (its own new) lives[3]. It follows that only response to this situation is a selective/semi-permeable intake of migrants. This short-term compensatory solution/outcry cannot be disassociated from hidden /mid-to-long term societal and security costs[4].

In business terms, this approach would be classified as “everything but development”: an economic strategy which relies on an increased volume of imports to substitute for an inadequate capital and production base.

Shall we blame the EC for not inventing the Commission’s portfolio: Promotion of life ?!

It would be very wrong to hold the Commission responsible (here the Tampere as well as the Hague program are explicit; MS are in charge for particular quotas)[5]. The Barroso Commission is limited in resources, mandates and instruments – as scrutinized by the Council. (At least, the Commission keeps up on initiatives !) The viable long range policy/ies on such a key issues as the future of our human capital (and its composition) primarily rest upon the MS.


The OSCE should recognize this as its strategic opportunity by playing a decisive pan-European role in the matter. The benefits of such pro-active stance are numerous:

Externally, the Organization can take a lead by formulating an interagency/inter-IOs approach to the benefit of its wider circle of MS (far beyond ability of institutions and instruments of either CoE or EU). Internally, the OSCE can recover both its standing and the purpose of its mission at the times when its first basket is de facto taken over by NATO (PfP), and its third basket is a source of disputes (including the budgetary ones) over its FOs interpretations.

Recognizing a call of its MS for reform, the new OSCE Sec–G. will inevitably challenge departmental inertia and the influence of the bureaucratic status quo. Rejection of anti-intellectualism and return to substantive initiatives, beyond the pure rotation of seasonal themes and nomadic form of preparatories to ‘reflect’ upon them, would give added value to annual forums. Additionally, that would necessitate the MS holding the chairmanship to capacitate more than the limited technical objectives of producing an annual report, dealing with conferences’ logistics, and staffing the organization with a few secondments in between.

The very creation of the OSCE Task Force on (Future) Human Capital could be a sign that the Organization is alive to the current challenges and fully assumes its share of responsibilities for future generations.

As an example, the Republic of Slovenia, the country currently holding the OSCE Chairmanship (CiO), will be by far the oldest nation in Europe by the year 2050. Only 45 years from now, the median age of Slovenians will have moved from the current (and barely reversible) 40,3 to an (irreversible) 53,3 years. This will be coupled with a projected 21% total population decline for the period 2004-2050 [6]. Demographic trends for other European nations are quite similar to the above.

In his last week Washington Post article, Samuelson calls this “The End of Europe”[7].

Can we tomorrow claim that we didn’t know, that we didn’t have institutions and instruments to analyze the developments critical to our own existence[8] ?

The OSCE offers a unique setting: matching the geographic scope and three-dimensional mandates – baskets. (Since its CSCE times, the FORA has transformed from a normative to an operational organization with the wide FO presence.) The Task Force on (Future) Human Capital can be easily included into the existing mandate.

Though a dangerous place to live, pre-Helsinki Europe was inhabited by young and dynamic boomers with stamina and a vision of the future. History of tomorrow is not yet written, but one is certain: Any (horror-scenario marginalized) post-OSCE Europe would be an equally dangerous place, but this time of over-aged and demoralized populations in total activity decline and human retreat.

It is accurate to conclude this addendum to my May 2005 Green/Policy Paper (EF Prague), by quoting Jean Monet: “If you have an insoluble problem – enlarge the context.”

Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chair IL&GPS

Vienna, 22 June 2005

[1] See my Green/Policy Paper and the statement of the Slovenian Chairmanship summarizing the recommendations and conclusions of the Economic Forum 2005 (particularly the final part of the statement), as well as .

[2] For detailed information on general demographic trends 1995-2020 & 2020-2050 in Europe and Med partner countries (fertility, median age, net migration, etc.) please see my presentations:

2PS13EFGeneral 14 Almaty, Kazakhstan (January 2005) – Second Preparatory;
3PS13EFGeneral 9 Kiev, Ukraine (March 2005) – Third Preparatory;
3PS13EFGeneral 14 Kiev, Ukraine (March 2005) – Third Preparatory;

[3] Or as it is formulated in the Commission’s Green Paper “Confronting demographic change – a new solidarity between generations” (COM 2005 94f of 16 MAR 2005); “Never in history has there been economic growth without population growth” (page:5);

[4] On hidden social and security costs, see my speech: 1PS13EFWS 2/3 Trieste, Italy (November 2004)

[5] Politics is always local not a supranational. Consequently, policies are national, and supranational/intl. may eventually be their external harmonization only. The long-range policies (formulation and promulgation of) do not politically pay off as often too complex and too time-consuming to survive a frequency of national elections span and the taste/comprehension of median voter.

[6] Hereby used is the so-called Medium variant. Source: the UN World Population Change 1950–2050, the 2004

Revision (Compared and contrasted with the figures of the US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census /2004/.)

[7] In his June 15 article, the highly regarded columnist Robert J. Samuelson summarizes some of these trends as “The

End of Europe”. Following an analysis of demographic trends, he concludes by observing that the Europeans “are quietly acquiescing in their own decline.”

[8] After nearly 2 million years of our species existence (in which a prime evolutionary constant/vertical was a generational care for the offsprings), last few decades are the first time ever recorded that humans went beyond the replacement ratio of 2,1 (current European fertility rate is ranging between 1,2 and 1,7).


 World Security Network reporting from Munich in Germany, March 05, 2012

Dear Cavkic Salih,
Former US Navy Secretary John F. Lehman on board the USS IOWA. "The nations best suited by geography, wealth, and national ambition to succeed the U.S. as the world’s great naval powers do not share America’s historic commitment to safety on the world’s oceans, to free trade, free markets, or an international system based on these goods as well as free political systems. The surrender of American naval superiority would embolden and nourish these opposing values at the expense of American prosperity, prestige, and power. The U.S. Navy must be restored to a size commensurate with its responsibilities and with the nation’s future security and position as the world’s great power.."

Dr. John F. Lehman has shaped the history of the U.S. Navy like few others. Aged only 38, he was assigned Secretary of the Navy in 1981 during the Reagan Adminstration. He subsequently became one of the key supporters and designers of Reagan's election pledge for military modernization and remarmament to enhance the strategic retaliation capabilities vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. Lehman devised the "Lehman Doctrine", a strategic concept to respond to a possible Soviet advance on Western Europe. Lehman resigned in 1987 and was subsequently promoted to the rank of captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1989, later retiring from the U.S. Navy as a reserve officer after 30 years of service.

In 2002 he was involved in the important 9/11 commission and is a member of numerous prestigious think tanks. He is a first cousin of the late Princess Grace of Monaco, and is Chairman of the Princess Grace Foundation-USA, a public charity established after Princess Grace's death to support emerging artists in film, dance, and theater. In his interview with World Security Network Junior Editor Constantin von Wangenheim he talks about the U.S. Navy's role in the 21st century.

Constantin Wangenheim: The U.S. Navy now has the smallest sized fleet since the 1930's. Is naval power no longer a moat?

John Lehman: The Cold War’s conclusion led to a reduction in fleet size whose end point remains unknown. Land wars in the Southwest and Central Asia worsened the decline by shifting attention away from China’s ambitious maritime challenge in the Western Pacific and Iran’s rise as a regional naval power. Additionally, the prospect that the Arab Spring will again return the Mediterranean to its historic position as an intersection of conflicting interest cannot be ignored.

At a time when danger to the U.S. and its allies and interests is growing the Obama administration has embraced the view that American power is in decline and that this decrease can be safely accommodated, even welcomed, in the interest of a safer world.

Constantin Wangenheim: What is the significance of “Sea Power” in this day and age?

John Lehman: The nations best suited by geography, wealth, and national ambition to succeed the U.S. as the world’s great naval powers do not share America’s historic commitment to safety on the world’s oceans, to free trade, free markets, or an international system based on these goods as well as free political systems. The surrender of American naval superiority would embolden and nourish these opposing values at the expense of American prosperity, prestige, and power. The U.S. Navy must be restored to a size commensurate with its responsibilities and with the nation’s future security and position as the world’s great power.

Constantin von Wangenheim: The Navy has many important tasks - one of which is humanitarian relief. In light of the in recent years frequently recurring natural desasters across the globe, is humanitarian relief becoming more important?

John Lehman:Since the first half of the 19th Century and its role in bringing relief to the famine in Ireland, the U.S. Navy has been involved in humanitarian assistance around the world. Most recently the U.S. Navy was first on the scene with medical teams and supplies, food assistance and support for the Tsunamis in Southeast Asia and then Japan, and the earthquakes in Haiti. Humanitarian relief will always be an important mission for the U.S. Navy.

Constantin Wangenheim: Has the Navy become less impoortant in ensuring national security vis-a-vis the Army and Air Force and how does this compare to the years before 9/11?

John Lehman: Since 90% of the world’s trade must travel by sea, and 95% of all military logistics must go by sea, the Navy is utterly essential to the freedom and security of all nations. This was not changed by 9/11.

Constantin Wangenheim: What exactly is the primary focus of the U.S. Navy?

John Lehman: The U.S. Navy has been the backbone of the nation’s global power since the Barbary Wars. In modern times our Navy played a central role in winning World War II and deterring aggression in the Cold War that followed. Americans today assume that our Navy will continue to protect allies, guarantee the safety of the oceanic highways on which our prosperity depends, and maintain the stabilizing international presence that are the foundation of the U.S.’s global reach and international prestige.

Constantin Wangenheim: The days of soldiers fighting in trenches are long gone. Modern technological innovation allows us to construct the most precise and deadly weapon systems which can be navigated unmanned across the whole globe. Will we no longer use manned aircraft in the future?

John Lehman: UAVs or drones are an important component of modern sea power but there will always be a requirement for manned aircraft. UAVs have been particularly effective in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they faced no serious threat from enemy fighters or integrated air defenses. The next war may not be with an opponent without effective air defense, and UAVs will have a much harder time.

Constantin von Wangenheim
Junior Editor
World Security Network Foundation

Date: 05.02.2012


 World Security Network reporting from Koenigswinter in Germany, March 07, 2012

Dear Cavkic Salih,

LtGen (ret) Dr. Ulf von Krause on foot patrol in Kabul, 2004: "The Afghanistan conflict makes it very clear that a first decision whether to become militarily involved in an armed conflict is crucial. It shows clearly that having slid into a conflict without proper analysis, having no clear goals and objectives, there is a great danger for an escalation and it is problematic to exit. Therefore, decision makers must take the necessary time to carefully evaluate the conditions, define the political goals and the military objectives, make sure that the resources needed are available and will be for the duration of the mission, and spell out exit conditions, i.e. criteria for success or failure. These necessary steps of mission preparation must be gone through even if expectations of allies and partners and time pressure seem to call for immediate decisions.

By 2012, the German Bundeswehr had been engaged in Afghanistan for ten years. The decision as to whether the Bundeswehr takes part in operations in an international context is primarily a responsibility of the Federal Government. However, armed operations undertaken by German forces always require the constitutional stamp of approval from the German Parliament (Bundestag) beforehand. The German Federal Constitutional Court clarified this through its decision in 1994.

Between November 2001 and January 2012, the Federal Government applied 22 times to the Bundestag for approval to Afghanistan mandates. The parliament accepted all of them. They related to two different missions: on the one hand, until 2008 Germany sent 100 soldiers of the Special Forces to the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan; on the other hand, Germany has contributed by now substantially to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Escalation with Regard to Number of Troops, Area of Operation, Equipment and Mission Type

Over time, the German participation in ISAF escalated in terms of the number of troops, the area of operation, the military equipment deployed and the character of the operation. Starting in 2002 with 1,200 military personal deployed in Kabul and restricted to the Greater Kabul Area the number of troops grew to a maximum of 5,350 in 2011. They are meanwhile deployed mainly in the Northern Region of Afghanistan where Germany, in addition, has the responsibility for commanding all coalition forces in that area. In January 2012, a revised mandate brought – for the first time in 10 years –a slight reduction of the authorized strength of German troops to 4,900.

The area of operation for German forces enlarged gradually from the Kabul area to the entire Northern Region, in specific situations even to the whole country. At the beginning equipment and armament of the forces comprised only light arms and mainly unarmored vehicles. Over the years, the German government added mechanized infantry combat vehicles, Tornado reconnaissance aircraft and artillery to the assets of its forces. Urgently needed combat helicopters could not been delivered nationally but were made available by US forces.

The prevailing operations during the first years of the mission were patrols for surveillance and liaison with local authorities and the population. Consequently, the rules of engagement allowed only self-defense in the case of direct attacks as long as those were enduring. If an opponent stopped his attack, the German troops had to cease fire even if they watched him preparing for the next attack. Later on fighting of insurgents became more and more important. Gradually but with a significant time lag the rules of engagement reflected this changing situation. From 2007-2010 German Tornados flew reconnaissance missions over all of Afghanistan. In 2008, German forces took over the task of a Quick Reaction Force for the Northern Region, a typical combat mission. After 2010 German troops were more and more engaged in combat operations to clear areas of insurgents.

Multilateralism as an Attribute of German Foreign Policy

These empirical findings lead to the question of how to explain such an escalation of the German contribution to ISAF. As a first approach to an answer one has to keep in mind that since World War II, in Germany a culture of a multilateral oriented foreign policy developed. In addition, German forces in Afghanistan are part of an international alliance of about 50 nations which have contributed troops. Therefore, from the very beginning the German Federal Government as well as the Bundestag always had to make their decisions in an international context.

For the first decision to contribute to OEF the overreaching reasoning was a promise of “unlimited solidarity” made by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to the United States that he had expressed in a parliamentary debate on 12 September 2001, one day after the attack on the World Trade Center. The spokespersons of all factions of the Bundestag had endorsed this declaration. Six weeks later the Chancellor, however, needed his strongest instrument to get parliamentary approval for his decision to contribute to OEF – he had to call for a vote of confidence. This was mainly due to the deep aversion of using military force as an instrument of politics, which is deeply rooted in the German national political culture and which was especially part of the self-conception of the Greens who were partners in the coalition. The fact that the NATO Council had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on 12 September 2001 – without any consequences with regard to military measures – did not play a perceptible role in this debate.

Another six weeks later again multilateral aspects prevailed in the German decision to contribute to ISAF. Germany had hosted the UN Bonn conference, the Chancellor wanted to exploit the positive image of the conference success. In addition, Germany had been striving towards a permanent seat in the UN Security Council since 1992. Therefore, the German Government did not want to reject the request of the UN for contributions to ISAF.

NATO took over the lead for ISAF in 2003 – actually on the request of Germany who was in the leading position at that time and who needed a replacement in this role. The alliance consequently used this as a chance for a practical demonstration of its ability as an organizational framework for military actions “out of area” which had been inaccessible in the political debates before. From then on, the German justification for its military engagement changed. It was now “Solidarity with NATO” instead of “Solidarity with the US”. The demands for increasing military strength by NATO –mainly driven by the US – were one substantial factor for the enlargement of the German contributions. In addition, the reorientation at the beginning of 2012 that led towards first steps of reducing the military strength was mainly multilaterally driven. NATO as well as Germany followed the decision of President Obama to withdraw the combat troops from Afghanistan by end of 2014.

To sum up: the German decisions were not based on specific German interests (which have not yet been defined) but by expectations of allies and partners. It was rather assumed that the interests of the alliance were identical with German interests.

Discrepancy between Political Goals and Military Objectives, and between Civilian and Military Resources

According to Clausewitz, the political goals for the use of military force determine the military objectives, which have to serve the political goals. From the beginning there was a discrepancy for ISAF: the German government defined the political goal as to “make a substantial contribution to the implementing of the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan which had started in the Bonn conference”. The military objective at the beginning was limited in numbers and the respective area of operation. Since the political goal was rather ambitious and “unlimited”, it generated pressure to enlarge the military efforts. Thus, the total ISAF strength as well as the German contingent was constantly increased and the area of operation expanded.

In addition, the goals of the partners of the coalition were differing. While ISAF should be a “stabilization mission”, the US-led OEF was a combat mission. Two different military operations in the same area are very problematic, not only from a military point of view but also politically. The “rough warfare” which the US chose for OEF led to substantial “collateral damage” amongst the population. It jeopardized ISAF’s goal to foster reconciliation and the coalition forces were losing the backing of the population. Therefore, the security situation eroded and the field commanders demanded additional military means to cope with a deteriorating situation.

To achieve the political goal of state building the military instrument can only contribute a small portion. The main thrust must come from civilian means such as diplomacy, economic aid or assistance in building up societal and state structures. This knowledge is well reflected in different strategic concepts, the first one to come from Germany. The so-called “Networked Security” was defined in the German White Paper 2006. It was introduced into the strategic discussion within NATO where it was adopted as “Comprehensive Approach” on the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The implementation of these conceptual goals, however, falls far behind. Measured by the input of resources, both personal and financial means, more than 70 % of the resources – not only in Germany – raised for Afghanistan are spent for the military, less than 30 % for civilian purposes. The conceptual ideas would demand just the opposite.

It was not before the end of 2009 that the international community defined the concept of handing over responsibility to the Afghan authorities as a political goal, which seems for the first time to be achievable militarily. This, however, is nothing else than an exit option, thus abandoning many of the ambitious goals of the past.

Whitewashing the Mission by German Politics – “This is not a War”

In Germany, where the definition of goals and objectives had been initially rather vague and with some discrepancies the Federal Government made substantial efforts to enunciate the goals for participation in the Afghanistan missions. In so-called “Afghanistan Concepts” –the first one was edited 2003 which is two years after the decision to engage – the government phrased very ambitious and partly unrealistic goals. In a country with traditionally decentralized societal structures, characterized after decades of civil war by poverty, deep ethnic and religious cleavages, a medieval society in the countryside and an entire breakdown of state structures it appears somewhat naive to name goals such as building a strong central government, modernizing society or democratization in a western sense.

However, politics in Germany needed such “glorified” goals to justify the military operation to a society with the deep conviction of a “civilian power”. Therefore, the German population was deluded by calling it a stabilization mission with “armed developers” instead of military men and women which was supported by media coverage in the first years. After NATO- responsibility for ISAF expanded in 2006 to the whole country, the distinction between OEF and ISAF diminished within NATO. Only in Germany, the Federal Government insisted in internal debates on the position that ISAF was not a combat mission because such operations were conducted by OEF.

In addition, German politicians refused to use a terminology, which could get in conflict with the desired image of a stabilization mission. For the Federal Government German soldiers were not in a “war”. This had negative effects for the soldiers because their legal status was in a grey zone, their equipment was partly not adequate and the rules of engagement were by 2009 not tailored to their mission. Beginning in 2008 the media brought severe incidents into the awareness of the population, which indicated that German soldiers were by no means “armed developers” but were fighting, dying and also killing in Afghanistan. The highlight of public attention was the bombing of two fuel trucks near Kundus on 5 September 2009 in which a large number of people died, including children. This forced the government to stop its whitewashing of the mission and to acknowledge that the Bundeswehr was fighting in a non-international armed conflict. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg and Chancellor Merkel were even using the word “war”.

Parliamentary Army vs. Escalation

In the German society exists the strong feeling that the Bundeswehr should only be engaged in defending its own country. Against this background and given the legal situation in Germany where a lot of power is invested the Bundestag, the question arises why the German parliament did not make any visible effort to slow down the escalation of the German military engagement. How could the Federal Government – cross-linked in diverse multilateral structures of International Organizations like UN, NATO or EU – push through its decisions in all 22 mandates in spite of massive resistance within the population toward the mission.

Here is the answer: although Germany has a Parliamentary Army, the Federal Government is factually dominating the decision processes even in parliament.
First, in the German parliamentarian system the control effort of coalition factions over “their” government is not very strong. Control functions are more the domain of the opposition. In times of a “Grand Coalition”, however, which Germany had for quite a period of time, the opposition is rather weak. And after a change of the majority ratio in parliament it takes some time before factions revise positions which they had taken when supporting a government. Therefore, a “Very Grand Coalition” has approved most mandates so far.

Second, the government has the power of agenda setting. It is drafting the mandates and sometimes sets very narrow time limits for parliamentary discussions; the Bundestag can only approve or reject the draft without altering the wording (although in the parliamentary practice the parliament has developed some ways of influencing the mandate by consultations in advance, by protocol notes or by time limits).

Third, the government has a substantial information advantage over the parliamentarians not least due to military confidentiality.

Fourth, the Bundestag in mandate debates has so far gotten lost in details rather than conducting a strategic discussion of the goals of German security policy. There have been, for example, no parliamentary hearings on such issues, as are normal in the US Congress. Therefore, in spite of the formal rather strong power of the Bundestag, there are no clear “parliamentarian skid marks” visible in the German decision processes.

Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Case

What are the lessons learned from the ten-year adventure of German Afghanistan missions? The first one is that Germany has to define its own security interests. This should take place in a discourse between politics, the academia and societal groups. As a result, the decision makers would have a benchmark when discussing an eventual involvement in a military conflict. It is for example hard to explain why German forces are involved in Afghanistan, Germany on the other hand refused to contribute to the NATO mission in Libya.

The second lesson refers to the first decision on military involvement. The Afghanistan conflict makes it very clear that such a first decision is crucial. It shows clearly that having slid into a conflict without proper analysis, having no clear goals and objectives, there is a great danger for an escalation and it is problematic to exit. Therefore, decision makers must take the necessary time to evaluate carefully the conditions, define the political goals and the military objectives, make sure that the resources needed are available and will be for the duration of the mission, and spell out exit conditions, i.e. criteria for success or failure. These necessary steps of mission preparation must be gone through even if expectations of allies and partners and time pressure seem to call for immediate decisions.

Thirdly, the German Bundestag should develop more critical parliamentary control in such questions concerning peace and war. This should include more assertiveness against governmental pressure, persistence in demanding sufficient information from the government and development of procedures for a strategic debate of security issues.

Fourth, the Federal Government and the Bundestag should learn from the Afghanistan case that they can not whitewash the character of a military mission with regard to a perceived mood in the population. Investigative journalism will bring the reality to light and politicians will loose credibility if they had tried to disguise their genuine motives.

Afghanistan after 2014

Finally, looking into the crystal ball, what are the perspectives for the Afghanistan mission after 2014? President Obama decided – and Germany as well as NATO followed this decision – to withdraw the combat troops by end of 2014. Whatever this means. By that timeline, Afghan security forces, i.e. Afghan National Army and Afghan Police Force, should be able to take care of the security in their country. In the latest German mandate, the reduction plan for 2012, is conditioned by the clause “if the situation allows”. And if not? The riots in Afghanistan after the burning of Koran books by US soldiers and the hasty withdrawal of German troops from Taloqan emphasize the importance of this question.

A further question is whether coalition forces engaged in partnering missions, i.e. accompanying Afghan units in combat missions, are combat troops and whether they will stay beyond 2014? On the other hand, will coalition forces with the primary task to train Afghans participate in fighting if the situation demands it? These questions show that militarily issues are still quite nebulous.

Yet, the announcement of withdrawal should enhance the use of non- military instruments. This would be a step forward in implementing the Comprehensive Approach NATO agreed on several years ago. The pledges of the international community made at the Bonn Conference in 2012 sound promising with this regard.

This article is based on the book by the author “Die Afghanistaneinsaetze der Bundeswehr – Politischer Entscheidungsprozess mit Eskalationsdynamik“ (The Afghanistan Missions of Bundeswehr – Political Decision Process with Escalation Dynamics“), published 2011 in Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, Germany. For evidence of statements in this article reference to the book would be necessary.

Dr. Ulf von Krause
LtGen (ret)
German Bundeswehr


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