

Ing. Salih CAVKIC


Murray Hunter
University Malaysia Perlis

Perpetual Self conflict: Self
awareness as a key to our ethical drive, personal mastery, and perception of
entrepreneurial opportunities.
Murray Hunter

The Continuum of Psychotic Organisational Typologies
Murray Hunter

There is no such person as an entrepreneur, just a person who acts
entrepreneurially
Murray Hunter

Groupthink may still be a hazard to your organization - Murray Hunter

Generational Attitudes and Behaviour - Murray Hunter

The environment as a multi-dimensional system: Taking off your rose
coloured glasses
- Murray Hunter

Imagination may be more important than knowledge: The eight types of
imagination we use - Murray Hunter

Do we have a creative intelligence? - Murray Hunter

Not all opportunities are the same: A look at the four types of
entrepreneurial opportunity -
Murray Hunter

The Evolution of Business Strategy
- Murray Hunter

How motivation really works - Murray Hunter

Evaluating Entrepreneurial Opportunities: What’s wrong with SWOT? -
Murray Hunter

The
five types of thinking we use - Murray Hunter

Where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from? - Murray Hunter

How
we create new ideas - Murray Hunter

How emotions influence, how we see the world? - Murray Hunter

People tend to start businesses for the wrong reasons - Murray Hunter

One Man, Multiple Inventions: The lessons and legacies of Thomas Edison
- Murray Hunte

Does Intrapreneurship exist in Asia?
- Murray Hunter

What’s
with all the hype – a look at aspirational marketing
- Murray Hunter

Integrating
the philosophy of Tawhid – an Islamic approach to organization
- Murray Hunter

Samsara and the Organization - Murray Hunter

Do Confucian Principled Businesses Exist in Asia? - Murray Hunter

Knowledge,
Understanding and the God Paradigm - Murray Hunter

On Some of the Misconceptions about
Entrepreneurship - Murray Hunter

How feudalism hinders community transformation and economic evolution: Isn’t
equal opportunity a basic human right? - Murray Hunter

The Dominance of “Western” Management Theories in South-East Asian Business
Schools: The occidental colonization of the mind. - Murray Hunter

Ethics, Sustainability and the New Realities - Murray Hunter

The Arrival of Petroleum, Rockefeller, and the Lessons He taught Us - Murray
Hunter - University Malaysia Perlis

Elite
educators idolize the “ high flying entrepreneurs” while deluded about the
realities of entrepreneurship for the masses: -
Murray Hunter

Lessons from the Invention of the airplane and the Beginning of the Aviation
Era - Murray Hunter

Missed Opportunities for ASEAN if the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) fails
to start up in 2015 - Murray Hunter
 |
Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and
Europe
Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic
How
to draw the line between the recent and still unsettled EU/EURO crisis and
Asia’s success story? Well, it might be easier than it seems: Neither Europe nor
Asia has any alternative. The difference is that Europe well knows there is no
alternative – and therefore is multilateral. Asia thinks it has an alternative –
and therefore is strikingly bilateral, while stubbornly residing enveloped in
economic egoisms. No wonder that Europe is/will be able to manage its decline,
while Asia is (still) unable to capitalize its successes.
Following the famous saying allegedly spelled by Kissinger: “Europe? Give me a
name and a phone number!” (when – back in early 1970s – urged by President Nixon
to inform Europeans on the particular US policy action), the author is trying to
examine how close is Asia to have its own telephone number.
By contrasting and comparing genesis of multilateral security structures in
Europe with those currently existing in Asia, and by listing some of the most
pressing security challenges in Asia, this policy paper offers several policy
incentives why the largest world’s continent must consider creation of the
comprehensive pan-Asian institution. Prevailing security structures in Asia are
bilateral and mostly asymmetric while Europe enjoys multilateral, balanced and
symmetric setups (American and African continents too). Author goes as far as to
claim that irrespective to the impressive economic growth, no Asian century will
emerge without creation of such an institution.
* * *
For over a decade, many of the relevant academic journals are full of articles
prophesizing the 21st as the Asian century. The argument is usually
based on the impressive economic growth, increased production and trade volumes
as well as the booming foreign currency reserves and exports of many populous
Asian nations, with nearly 1/3 of total world population inhabiting just two
countries of the largest world’s continent. However, history serves as a
powerful reminder by warning us that economically or/and demographically mighty
gravity centers tend to expand into their peripheries, especially when the
periphery is weaker by either category. It means that any absolute or relative
shift in economic and demographic strength of one subject of international
relations will inevitably put additional stress on the existing power
equilibriums and constellations that support this balance in the particular
theater of implicit or explicit structure.

Click to enlarge
Lessons of the Past
Thus, what is the state of art of Asia’s security structures? What is the
existing capacity of preventive diplomacy and what instruments are at disposal
when it comes to early warning/ prevention, fact-finding, exchange mechanisms,
reconciliation, capacity and confidence– building measures in the Asian theater?
While all other major theaters do have the pan-continental settings in place
already for many decades, such as the Organization of American States – OAS
(American continent), African Union – AU (Africa), Council of Europe and
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE (Europe), the
state-of-arts of the largest world’s continent is rather different. What becomes
apparent, nearly at the first glance, is the absence of any pan-Asian security/
multilateral structure. Prevailing security structures are bilateral and mostly
asymmetric. They range from the clearly defined and enduring non-aggression
security treaties, through less formal arrangements, up to the Ad hoc
cooperation accords on specific issues. The presence of the multilateral
regional settings is limited to a very few spots in the largest continent, and
even then, they are rarely mandated with security issues in their declared scope
of work. Another striking feature is that most of the existing bilateral
structures have an Asian state on one side, and either peripheral or external
protégé country on the other side which makes them nearly per definition
asymmetric. The examples are numerous: the US–Japan, the US– S. Korea, the
US–Singapore, Russia–India, Australia–East Timor, Russia–North Korea, Japan
–Malaysia, China–Pakistan, the US–Pakistan, China–Cambodia, the US–Saudi Arabia,
Russia –Iran, China–Burma, India–Maldives, Iran–Syria, N. Korea–Pakistan, etc.
Indeed, Asia today resonates a mixed echo of the European past. It combines
features of the pre-Napoleonic, post-Napoleonic and the League-of-Nations
Europe. What are the useful lessons from the European past? Well, there are a
few, for sure. Bismarck accommodated the exponential economic, demographic and
military growth as well as the territorial expansion of Prussia by skillfully
architecturing and calibrating the complex networks of bilateral security
arrangements of 19th century Europe. Like Asia today, it was not an
institutionalized security structure of Europe, but a talented leadership
exercising restraint and wisdom in combination with the quick assertiveness and
fast military absorptions, concluded by the lasting endurance. However, as soon
as the new Kaiser removed the Iron Chancellor (Bismarck), the provincial and
backward–minded, insecure and militant Prussian establishment contested (by
their own interpretations of the German’s machtpolitik and weltpolitik
policies) Europe and the world in two devastating world wars. That, as well as
Hitler’s establishment afterwards, simply did not know what to do with a
powerful Germany.
The aspirations and constellations of some of Asia’s powers today remind us also
of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, in which a unified, universalistic block of the
Holy Roman Empire was contested by the impatient challengers of the status quo.
Such serious centripetal and centrifugal oscillations of Europe were not without
grave deviations: as much as Cardinal Richelieu’s and Jacobin’s France
successfully emancipated itself, the Napoleon III and pre-WWII France encircled,
isolated itself, implicitly laying the foundation for the German attack.
Finally, the existing Asian regional settings also resemble the picture of the
post-Napoleonic Europe: first and foremost, of Europe between the Vienna
Congress of 1815 and the revolutionary year of 1848. At any rate, let us take a
quick look at the most relevant regional settings in Asia.

Multilateral constellations
By far, the largest Asian participation is with the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation – APEC, an organization engulfing both sides of the Pacific Rim.
Nevertheless, this is a forum for member economies not of sovereign nations, a
sort of a prep-com or waiting room for the World Trade Organization – WTO. To
use the words of one senior Singapore diplomat who recently told me in Geneva
the following: “what is your option here? ...to sign the Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
side up with the US, login to FaceBook, and keep shopping on the internet
happily ever after…”
Two other crosscutting settings, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – OIC
and Non-Aligned Movement – NAM, the first with and the second without a
permanent secretariat, represent the well-established political multilateral
bodies. However, they are inadequate forums as neither of the two is strictly
mandated with security issues. Although both trans-continental entities do have
large memberships being the 2nd and 3rd largest
multilateral systems, right after the UN, neither covers the entire Asian
political landscape – having important Asian countries outside the system or
opposing it.
Further on, one should mention the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization – KEDO (Nuclear) and the Iran-related Contact (Quartet/P-5+1)
Group. In both cases, the issues dealt with are indeed security related, but
they are more an asymmetric approach to deter and contain a single country by
the larger front of peripheral states that are opposing a particular security
policy, in this case, of North Korea and of Iran. Same was with the short-lived
SEATO Pact – a defense treaty organization for SEA which was essentially
dissolved as soon as the imminent threat from communism was slowed down and
successfully contained within the French Indochina.
Confidence building – an attempt
If some of the settings are reminiscent of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO and Cooperation Council for the Arab
states of the Gulf – GCC remind us of the post-Napoleonic Europe and its
Alliance of the Eastern Conservative courts (of Metternich). Both arrangements
were created on a pretext of a common external ideological and geopolitical
threat, on a shared status quo security consideration. Asymmetric GCC was an
externally induced setting by which an American key Middle East ally Saudi
Arabia gathered the grouping of the Arabian Peninsula monarchies. It has served
a dual purpose; originally, to contain the leftist Nasseristic pan-Arabism which
was introducing a republican type of egalitarian government in the Middle
Eastern theater. It was also – after the 1979 revolution – an instrument to
counter-balance the Iranian influence in the Gulf and wider Middle East. The
response to the spring 2011-13 turmoil in the Middle East, including the
deployment of the Saudi troops in Bahrain, and including the analysis of the
role of influential Qatar-based and GCC-backed Al Jazeera TV network is the best
proof of the very nature of the GCC mandate.
The SCO is internally induced and more symmetric setting. Essentially, it came
into existence through a strategic Sino-Russian rapprochement[1],
based, for the first time in modern history, on parity, to deter external
aspirants (the US, Japan, Korea, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) and to keep the
resources, territory, present socio-economic cultural and political regime in
the Central Asia, Tibet heights and the Xinjiang Uighur province in line.
The next to consider is the Indian sub-continent’s grouping, the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation – SAARC. This organization has a
well-established mandate, well staffed and versed Secretariat. However, the
Organization is strikingly reminiscent of the League of Nations. The League is
remembered as an altruistic setup which repeatedly failed to adequately respond
to the security quests of its members as well as to the challenges and pressures
of parties that were kept out of the system (e.g. Russia until well into the
1930s and the US remaining completely outside the system, and in the case of the
SAARC surrounding; China, Saudi Arabia and the US). The SAARC is practically a
hostage of mega confrontation of its two largest members, both confirmed nuclear
powers; India and Pakistan. These two challenge each other geopolitically and
ideologically. Existence of one is a negation of the existence of the other; the
religiously determined nationhood of Pakistan is a negation of multiethnic India
and vice verse. Additionally, the SAARC although internally induced is an
asymmetric organization. It is not only the size of India, but also its
position: centrality of that country makes SAARC practically impossible to
operate in any field without the direct consent of India, be it commerce,
communication, politics or security.
For a serious advancement of multilateralism, mutual trust, a will to compromise
and achieve a common denominator through active co-existence is the key. It is
hard to build a common course of action around the disproportionately big and
centrally positioned member which would escape the interpretation as containment
by the big or assertiveness of its center by the smaller, peripheral members.
Multivector Foreign Policy
Finally, there is an ASEAN – a grouping of 10 Southeast Asian nations[2],
exercising the balanced multi-vector policy, based on the non-interference
principle, internally and externally. This, Jakarta/Indonesia headquartered[3]
organization has a dynamic past and an ambitious current charter. It is an
internally induced and relatively symmetric arrangement with the strongest
members placed around its geographic center, like in case of the EU equilibrium
with Germany-France/Britain-Italy/Poland-Spain geographically balancing each
other. Situated on the geographic axis of the southern flank of the Asian
landmass, the so-called growth triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia
represents the core of the ASEAN not only in economic and communication terms
but also by its political leverage. The EU-like ASEAN Community Road Map (for
2015) will absorb most of the Organization’s energy[4].
However, the ASEAN has managed to open its forums for the 3+3 group/s, and could
be seen in the long run as a cumulus setting towards the wider pan-Asian forum
in future.
Before closing this brief overview, let us mention two recently inaugurated
informal forums, both based on the external calls for a burden sharing. One,
with a jingoistic-coined name by the Wall Street bankers[5]
- BRI(I)C/S, so far includes two important Asian economic, demographic and
political powerhouses (India and China), and one peripheral (Russia). Indonesia,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran are a few additional Asian
countries whose national pride and pragmatic interests are advocating a BRIC
membership. The G–20, the other informal forum, is also assembled on the Ad hoc
(pro bono) basis following the need of the G–7 to achieve a larger approval and
support for its monetary (currency exchange accord) and financial (austerity)
actions introduced in the aftermath of still unsettled financial crisis.
Nevertheless, the BRIC and G-20 have not provided the Asian participating states
either with the more leverage in the Bretton Woods institutions besides a burden
sharing, or have they helped to tackle the indigenous Asian security problems.
Appealing for the national pride, however, both informal gatherings may divert
the necessary resources and attention to Asian states from their pressing
domestic, pan-continental issues.
Yet, besides the UN system machinery of the Geneva-based Disarmament committee,
the UN Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons – OPCW and International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA (or CTBTO), even
the ASEAN Asians (as the most multilateralized Asians) have no suitable standing
forum to tackle and solve their security issues. An organization similar to the
Council of Europe or the OSCE is still far from emerging on Asian soil.
Our history warns. Nevertheless, it also provides a hope: The pre-CSCE
(pre-Helsinki) Europe was indeed a dangerous place to live in. The sharp
geopolitical and ideological default line was passing through the very heart of
Europe, cutting it into halves. The southern Europe was practically sealed off
by notorious dictatorships; in Greece (Colonel Junta), Spain (Franco) and
Portugal (Salazar), with Turkey witnessing several of its governments toppled by
the secular and omnipotent military establishment, with inverted Albania and a
(non-Europe minded) non-allied, Tito’s Yugoslavia. Two powerful instruments of
the US military presence (NATO) and of the Soviets (Warsaw pact) in Europe were
keeping huge standing armies, enormous stockpiles of conventional as well as the
ABC weaponry and delivery systems, practically next to each other. By far and
large, European borders were not mutually recognized. Essentially, the west
rejected to even recognize many of the Eastern European, Soviet
dominated/installed governments.
Territorial disputes unresolved
Currently in Asia, there is hardly a single state which has no territorial
dispute within its neighborhood. From the Middle East, Caspian and Central Asia,
Indian sub-continent, mainland Indochina or Archipelago SEA, Tibet, South China
Sea and the Far East, many countries are suffering numerous green and blue
border disputes. The South China Sea solely counts for over a dozen territorial
disputes – in which mostly China presses peripheries to break free from the
long-lasting encirclement. These moves are often interpreted by the neighbors as
dangerous assertiveness. On the top of that Sea resides a huge economy and
insular territory in a legal limbo – Taiwan, which waits for a time when the
pan-Asian and intl. agreement on how many Chinas Asia should have, gains a wide
and lasting consensus.
Unsolved territorial issues, sporadic irredentism, conventional armament,
nuclear ambitions, conflicts over exploitation of and access to the marine
biota, other natural resources including fresh water access and supply are
posing enormous stress on external security, safety and stability in Asia.
Additional stress comes from the newly emerging environmental concerns, that are
representing nearly absolute security threats, not only to the tiny Pacific
nation of Tuvalu[6],
but also to the Maldives, Bangladesh, Cambodia, parts of Thailand, of Indonesia,
of Kazakhstan and of the Philippines, etc[7].
All this combined with uneven economic and demographic dynamics[8]
of the continent are portraying Asia as a real powder keg.
It is absolutely inappropriate to compare the size of Asia and Europe – the
latter being rather an extension of a huge Asian continental landmass, a sort of
western Asian peninsula – but the interstate maneuvering space is comparable.
Yet, the space between the major powers of post-Napoleonic Europe was as equally
narrow for any maneuver as is the space today for any security maneuver of
Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the like.
Let us also take a brief look at the peculiarities of the nuclear constellations
in Asia. Following the historic analogies; it echoes the age of the American
nuclear monopoly and the years of Russia’s desperation to achieve the parity.
Besides holding huge stockpiles of conventional weaponry and numerous standing
armies, Asia is a home of four (plus peripheral Russia and Israel) of the nine
known nuclear powers (declared and undeclared). Only China and Russia are
parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty – NPT. North Korea walked away in 2003,
whereas India and Pakistan both confirmed nuclear powers declined to sign the
Treaty. Asia is also the only continent on which nuclear weaponry has been
deployed.
Cold War exiled in Asia
As is well known, the peak of the Cold War was marked by the mega geopolitical
and ideological confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers whose stockpiles by
far outnumbered the stockpiles of all the other nuclear powers combined. However
enigmatic, mysterious and incalculable to each other[9],
the Americans and Soviets were on opposite sides of the globe, had no
territorial disputes, and no record of direct armed conflicts.
Insofar, the Asian nuclear constellation is additionally specific as each of the
holders has a history of hostilities – armed frictions and confrontations over
unsolved territorial disputes along the shared borders, all combined with the
intensive and lasting ideological rivalries. The Soviet Union had bitter
transborder armed frictions with China over the demarcation of its long land
border. China has fought a war with India and has acquired a significant
territorial gain. India has fought four mutually extortive wars with Pakistan
over Kashmir and other disputed bordering regions. Finally, the Korean peninsula
has witnessed the direct military confrontations of Japan, USSR, Chinese as well
as the US on its very soil, and remains a split nation under a sharp ideological
divide.
On the western edge of the Eurasian continent, neither France, Britain, Russia
nor the US had a (recent) history of direct armed conflicts. They do not even
share land borders.
Finally, only India and now post-Soviet Russia have a strict and full civilian
control over its military and the nuclear deployment authorization. In the case
of North Korea and China, it is in the hands of an unpredictable and
non-transparent communist leadership – meaning, it resides outside democratic,
governmental decision-making. In Pakistan, it is completely in the hands of a
politically omnipresent military establishment. Pakistan has lived under a
direct military rule for over half of its existence as an independent state.
What eventually kept the US and the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons was the
dangerous and costly struggle called: “mutual destruction assurance”. Already by
the late 1950s, both sides achieved parity in the number and type of nuclear
warheads as well as in the number and precision of their delivery systems. Both
sides produced enough warheads, delivery systems’ secret depots and launching
sites to amply survive the first impact and to maintain a strong second-strike
capability[10].
Once comprehending that neither the preventive nor preemptive nuclear strike
would bring a decisive victory but would actually trigger the final global
nuclear holocaust and ensure total mutual destruction, the Americans and the
Soviets have achieved a fear–equilibrium through the hazardous deterrence. Thus,
it was not an intended armament rush (for parity), but the non-intended Mutual
Assurance Destruction – MAD – with its tranquilizing effect of nuclear weaponry,
if possessed in sufficient quantities and impenetrable configurations – that
brought a bizarre sort of pacifying stability between two confronting
superpowers. Hence, MAD prevented nuclear war, but did not disarm the
superpowers.
As noted, the nuclear stockpiles in Asia are considerably modest[11].
The number of warheads, launching sites and delivery systems is not sufficient
and sophisticated enough to offer the second strike capability. That fact
seriously compromises stability and security: preventive or preemptive N–strike
against a nuclear or non-nuclear state could be contemplated as decisive,
especially in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the Middle
East[12].
A general wisdom of geopolitics assumes the potentiality of threat by examining
the degree of intensions and capability of belligerents. However, in Asia this
theory does not necessarily hold the complete truth: Close geographic
proximities of Asian nuclear powers means shorter flight time of warheads, which
ultimately gives a very brief decision-making period to engaged adversaries.
Besides a deliberate, a serious danger of an accidental nuclear war is therefore
evident.
Multilateral mechanisms
One of the greatest thinkers and humanists of the 20th century, Erich
Fromm wrote: “…man can only go forward by developing (his) reason, by finding
a new harmony…”[13]
There is certainly a long road from vision and wisdom to a clear political
commitment and accorded action. However, once it is achieved, the operational
tools are readily at disposal. The case of Helsinki Europe is very instructive.
To be frank, it was the over-extension of the superpowers who contested one
another all over the globe, which eventually brought them to the negotiation
table. Importantly, it was also a constant, resolute call of the European public
that alerted governments on both sides of the default line. Once the political
considerations were settled, the technicalities gained momentum: there was – at
first – mutual pan-European recognition of borders which tranquilized tensions
literally overnight. Politico-military cooperation was situated in the so-called
first Helsinki basket, which included the joint military inspections, exchange
mechanisms, constant information flow, early warning instruments,
confidence–building measures mechanism, and the standing panel of state
representatives (the so-called Permanent Council). Further on, an important
clearing house was situated in the so-called second basket – the forum that
links the economic and environmental issues, items so pressing in Asia at the
moment.
Admittedly, the III OSCE Basket was a source of many controversies in the past
years, mostly over the interpretation of mandates. However, the new wave of
nationalism, often replacing the fading communism, the emotional charges and
residual fears of the past, the huge ongoing formation of the middle class in
Asia whose passions and affiliations will inevitably challenge established
elites domestically and question their policies internationally, and a related
search for a new social consensus – all that could be successfully tackled by
some sort of an Asian III basket. Clearly, further socio-economic growth in Asia
is impossible without the creation and mobilization of a strong middle class – a
segment of society which when appearing anew on the socio-political horizon is
traditionally very exposed and vulnerable to political misdeeds and disruptive
shifts. At any rate, there are several OSCE observing nations from Asia[14];
from Thailand to Korea and Japan, with Indonesia, a nation that currently
considers joining the forum. They are clearly benefiting from the participation[15].
Consequently, the largest continent should consider the creation of its own
comprehensive pan-Asian multilateral mechanism. In doing so, it can surely rest
on the vision and spirit of Helsinki. On the very institutional setup, Asia can
closely revisit the well-envisioned SAARC and ambitiously empowered ASEAN[16]
fora. By examining these two regional bodies, Asia can find and skillfully
calibrate the appropriate balance between widening and deepening of the security
mandate of such future multilateral organization – given the number of states
as well as the gravity of the pressing socio-political, environmental and
politico-military challenges.
In the age of unprecedented success and the unparalleled prosperity of Asia, an
indigenous multilateral pan-Asian arrangement presents itself as an opportunity.
Contextualizing Hegel’s famous saying that “freedom is…an insight into
necessity” let me close by stating that a need for the domesticated
pan-Asian organization warns by its urgency too.
Clearly, there is no emancipation of the continent; there is no Asian century,
without the pan-Asian multilateral setting.
Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chairman Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies
(author of the forthcoming book ‘Is there life after Facebook’, Addleton
Academic Publishers, NY)
Vienna, 14 FEB 13
anis@bajrektarevic.eu
Post Scriptum
How can we observe and interpret (the distance between) success and fall from a
historical perspective? This question remains a difficult one to (satisfy all
with a single) answer... The immediate force behind the rapid and
successful European overseas projection was the two elements combined: Europe’s
technological (economic) and demographic expansion (from early 16th
century on). However, West/Europe was not – frankly speaking – winning over the
rest of this planet by the superiority of its views and ideas, by purity of its
virtues or by clarity of its religious thoughts and practices. For a small and
rather insecure civilization, it was just the superiority and efficiency in
applying the rationalized violence and organized (legitimized) coercion that
Europe successfully projected. The 21st century Europeans often
forget this ‘inconvenient truth’, the non-Europeans usually never do. The large,
self-maintainable, self-assured and secure civilizations (e.g. situated on the
Asian landmass) were traditionally less militant and confrontational (and a
nation-state ‘demarcational’), but more esoteric and generous, inclusive
attentive and flexible. The smaller, insecure civilizations (e.g. situated on a
modest and minor, geographically remote and peripheral, natural resources
scarce, and climatically exposed continent of Europe) were more focused,
obsessively organized and a “goal–oriented” (including the invention of virtue
out of necessity – a nation-state). No wonder that European civilization has
never ever generated a single religion (although it admittedly doctrinated,
‘clergified’ and headquartered the Middle East-revelled religion of
Christianity). On the other hand, no other civilization but the European has
ever created a significant, even a relevant political ideology.
Acknowledgments
For the last ten years I hosted over 100 ambassadors at my university, some 30
from Asia alone. Several of them are currently obtaining very high governmental
positions in their respective countries (including the Foreign Minister posts).
It would be inappropriate to name them here. However, let me express my sincere
gratitude for all the talks and meetings which helped an early ‘fermentation’ of
the thesis claim as such. Finally, I would like to name the following
personalities for the valuable intellectual encounters and their sometimes
opposing but always inspiring and constructive comments in the course of
drafting the article:
H.E. Mr. Dato’ Misran KARMAIN, the ASEAN Deputy Secretary General
H.E. Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka PUJA, Indonesia’s Ambassador and Permanent
Representative to the UN and other IO’s in Vienna
H.E. Ms. Nongnuth PHETCHARATANA, Thai Ambassador and Permanent Representative to
the OSCE, UN and other IO’s in Vienna
H.E. Ms. Linglingay F. LACANLALE, the Philippines’ Ambassador to Thailand and
the UN ESCAP
H.E. Mr. Khamkheuang BOUNTEUM, Laos’ Ambassador and Permanent Representative to
the UN and other IO’s in Vienna
H.E. Mr. Ba Than NGUYEN, Vietnam’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to
the UN and other IO’s in Vienna
H.E. Mr. Ibrahim DJIKIC, Ambassador and former OSCE Mission Head to Ashgabat
However, the views expressed are solely those of the author himself.
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ABSTRACT:
Following the famous saying allegedly spelled by Kissinger: “Europe? Give me a
name and a phone number!” (when – back in early 1970s – urged by President Nixon
to inform Europeans on the particular US policy action), the author is trying to
examine how close is Asia to have its own telephone number.
By contrasting and comparing genesis of multilateral security structures in
Europe with those currently existing in Asia, and by listing some of the most
pressing security challenges in Asia, this article offers several policy
incentives why the largest world’s continent must consider creation of the
comprehensive pan-Asian institution. Prevailing security structures in Asia are
bilateral and mostly asymmetric while Europe enjoys multilateral, balanced and
symmetric setups (American and African continents too). Author goes as far as to
claim that irrespective to the impressive economic growth, no Asian century will
emerge without creation of such an institution.
Key words:
Security, multilateralism, Asia, geopolitics, geo-economics, preventive
diplomacy, (nuclear weapons, border disputes, Council of Europe, OSCE, OAS, AU,
EU, NATO, OIC, NAM, ASEAN, APEC, SAARC, GCC, SCO, KEDO, SEATO, BRIC, G-7, G-20,
Japan, China, the US, Russia/SU, Alliance of Eastern Conservative Courts,
pre-Napoleonic Europe, growth, middle class, nationalism)
[1] Analyzing the Sino-Soviet and post-Soviet-Sino
relations tempts me to compare it with the Antic Roman Empire. The monolithic
block has entered its fragmentation on a seemingly rhetoric, clerical question –
who would give the exclusive interpretation of the holy text: Rome or
Constantinople. Clearly, the one who holds the monopoly on the interpretation
has the ideological grip, which can easily be translated into a strategic
advantage. It was Moscow insisting that the Soviet type of communism was the
only true and authentic communism. A great schism put to an end the lasting
theological but also geopolitical conflict in the antique Roman theatre. The
Sino-Soviet schism culminated with the ideological and geopolitical emancipation
of China, especially after the Nixon recognition of Beijing China. Besides the
ideological cleavages, the socio-economic and political model of the Roman
Empire was heavily contested from the 3rd century onwards. The
Western Roman Empire rigidly persisted to any structural change, unable to
adapt. It eroded and soon thereafter vanished from the political map. The
Eastern Empire successfully reformed and Byzantium endured as a viable
socio-economic and political model for another 1,000 years. Feeling the need for
an urgent reshape of the declining communist system, both leaders Gorbachev and
Deng Xiaoping contemplated reforms. Gorbachev eventually fractured the Soviet
Union with glasnost and perestroika. Deng managed China
successfully. Brave, accurate and important argumentation comes from diplomat
and prolific author Kishore Mahbubani (The New Asian Hemisphere, 2008, page
44-45). Mahbubani claims that Gorbachev handed over the Soviet empire and got
nothing in return, while Deng understood “the real success of Western strength
and power … China did not allow the students protesting in Tiananmen Square”.
Consequently, Deng drew a sharp and decisive line to avoid the fate of Russia,
and allowed only perestroika. China has survived, even scoring the
unprecedented prosperity in only the last two decades. Russia has suffered a
steep decline in the aftermath of the loss of its historic empire, including the
high suicide and crime rates as well as the severe alcohol problems. Gorbachev
himself moved to the US, and one vodka brand labels his name.
[2] The membership might be extended in the future
to East Timor and Papua New Guinea.
[3] Symbolic or not, the ASEAN HQ is located less
than 80 miles away from the place of the historical, the NAM–precursor, the
Asian–African Conference of Bandung 1955.
[4] Comparisons pose an inaccuracy risks as
history often finds a way to repeat itself, but optimism finally prevails.
Tentatively, we can situate the ASEAN today, where the pre-Maastricht EU was
between the Merge Treaty and the Single European Act.
[5] The acronym was originally coined by Jim
O’Neill, a chief global economist of Goldman Sachs, in his 2001 document report:
“Building Better Global Economic BRICs”. This document was elaborating on
countries which may provide the West with the socially, economically and
politically cheap primary commodities and undemanding labor force, finally
suggesting to the West to balance such trade by exporting its high-prized final
products in return. The paper did not foresee either creation of any BRIC
grouping or the nomadic change of venue places of its periodic meetings. O’Neill
initially tipped Brazil, Russia, India and China, although at recent meetings
South Africa was invited (BRICS) with the pending Indonesia (BRIICS).
[6] Tuvalu, a country composed of low-laying atoll
islands, faces an imminent complete loss of state territory. This event would
mark a precedent in the theory of intl. law – that one country suffers a
complete geographic loss of its territory.
[7] Detailed environmental impact risk assessments
including the no-go zones are available in the CRESTA reports. The CRESTA
Organization is powered by the Swiss RE as a consortium of the leading insurance
and reinsurance companies.
[8] The intriguing intellectual debate is
currently heating up the western world. Issues are fundamental: Why is science
turned into religion? Practiced economy is based on the over 200-years old
liberal theory of Adam Smith and over 300-years old philosophy of Hobbes and
Locke – basically, frozen and rigidly canonized into a dogmatic exegesis.
Scientific debate is replaced by a blind obedience. Why is religion turned into
political ideology? Religious texts are misinterpreted and ideologically misused
in Europe, ME, Asia, Americas and Africa. Why is the secular or religious ethics
turned from the bio-centric comprehension into the anthropocentric environmental
ignorance? The resonance of these vital debates is gradually reaching Asian
elites. No one can yet predict the range and scope of their responses,
internally or externally. One is certain; Asia understood that the global
(economic) integration can not be a substitute for any viable development
strategy. Globalization, as experienced in Asia and observed elsewhere, did not
offer a shortcut to development, even less to social cohesion, environmental
needs, domestic employment, educational uplift of the middle class and general
public health.
[9] The Soviet Union was enveloped in secrecy, a
political culture, eminent in many large countries, which the Soviets inherited
from the Tsarist Russia and further enhanced – a feature that puzzled Americans.
It was the US cacophony of open, nearly exhibitionistic policy debates that
puzzled Russians – and made both sides unable to predict the moves of the other
one. The Soviets were confused by the omnipresence of overt political debate in
the US, and the Americans were confused by the absence of any political debate
in the USSR. Americans well knew that the real power resided outside the
government, in the Soviet Politburo. Still, it was like a black-box – to use a
vivid Kissinger allegory, things were coming in and getting out, but nobody
figured out what was happening inside. Once the particular decision had been
taken, the Soviets implemented it persistently in a heavy-handed and rigid way.
Usually, the policy alternation/adjustment was not coming before the personal
changes at the top of the SU Politburo – events happening so seldom. On the
other hand, the Soviets were confused by the equidistant constellation of the US
executive, legislative and judicial branches – for the Soviet taste, too often
changed, the chaotic setup of dozens of intelligence and other enforcement
agencies, the role of the media and the public, and the influential lobby groups
that crosscut the US bipartisanism – all which participated in the decision prep
and making process. Even when brokered, the US actions were often altered or
replaced in zigzagging turns. The US was unable to grasp where the Communist
Party ended and the USSR government started. By the same token, the Soviets were
unable to figure out where the corporate America ended and the US government
started. Paradoxically enough, the political culture of one prevented it from
comprehending and predicting the actions of the other one. What was the logical
way for one was absolutely unthinkable and illogical for the other.
[10] As Waltz rightfully concludes: “Conventional
weapons put a premium on striking first to gain the initial advantage and set
the course of the war. Nuclear weapons eliminate this premium. The initial
advantage is insignificant…”… due to the second strike capability of both
belligerents. (‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed’ by Scott D.
Sagan and Kenneth N Waltz, 2003, p. 112).
[11] It is assumed that Pakistan has as few as 20
combat/launching ready fission warheads, India is believed to have some 60, and
Korea (if any, not more than) 2-3 only. Even China, considered as the senior
nuclear state, has not more than 20 ICBM.
[12] Israel as a non-declared nuclear power is
believed to have as many as 200 low-powered fission nuclear bombs. A half of it
is deliverable by the mid-range missile Jericho II, planes and mobile (hide and
relocate) launchers (including the recently delivered, nuclear war-head capable
German submarines). Iran successfully tested the precision of its mid-range
missile and keeps ambitiously working on the long-range generation of missiles.
At the same time, Iran may well have acquired some vital dual-use (so far,
peaceful purpose) nuclear technologies. There is a seed of nuclear ambition all
over the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the least shy ones.
[13] “The Art of Loving”, Erich Fromm, 1956, page
76. Fromm wrote it at about the time of the Bandung conference.
[14] The so-called OSCE–Asian Partners for
Cooperation are: Japan (1992), Korea (1994), Thailand (2000), Afghanistan
(2003), Mongolia (2004) and Australia (2009). Within the OSCE quarters,
particularly Thailand and Japan enjoy a reputation of being very active.
[15] It is likely to expect that five other ASEAN
countries, residentially represented in Vienna, may formalize their relation
with OSCE in a due time. The same move could be followed by the Secretariats of
both SAARC and ASEAN.
[16] In Europe and in Asia – even when being at
the HQ in Jakarta, I am often asked to clarify my (overly) optimistic views on
the ASEAN future prospects. The ASEAN as well as the EU simply have no
alternative but to survive and turn successful, although currently suffering
many deficiencies and being far from optimized multilateral mechanisms. Any
alternative to the EU is a grand accommodation of either France or Germany with
Russia – meaning a return to Europe of the 18th, 19th and
early 20th centuries – namely, perpetual wars and destructions. Any
alternative to the ASEAN would be an absorptive accommodation of particular
ASEAN member states to either Japan or China or India – meaning fewer large
blocks on a dangerous collision course. Thus, paradoxically enough in cases of
both the EU and of ASEAN, it is not (only) the inner capacitation but the
external constellations that make me optimistic about their respective success.
02.05.2013
PUBLICATIONS:
Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof. Anis
H. Bajrektarevic
Searching for an end game in the Korean Crisis - Murray Hunter
Turks suspicious
towards German Government - Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann
The high Australian Dollar: Whose
interests is the Reserve Bank of Australia looking after? - Murray Hunter
Is Secretary Kerry's trip to
China a "face saving" measure? - Murray Hunter
Asia-Pacific at
the Crossroads - The Implications for Australian Strategic Defense Policy -
Murray Hunter
Obama's Korean
Peninsula "Game" Strategy seeks to achieve a wide range of objectives in his
"Asian Pivot" - Murray Hunter
Institute for the research of genocide - IGC Letter Regarding Vuk Jeremic Agenda in UN
Who rules Singapore? - The only true mercantile state in the world - Murray
Hunter
The Thai Deep South: Both Malaysia and
Thailand Desperately Seeking Success - Murray Hunter
The desperate plight of Islamic education in Southern Thailand - Murray Hunte
Who makes public policy in Malaysia? - Murray Hunter
MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Australia's National Security Paper: Did it
amount to lost opportunities? The policy you have when you don't have a policy -
Murray Hunter
Are "B" Schools in Developing Countries
infatuated with 'Western' Management ideas? - Murray Hunter
The Stages of Economic Development from
an Opportunity Perspective: Rostow Extended - Murray Hunter
Who Really Rules Australia?: A tragic tale of the Australian People - Murray
Hunter
Europe: Something Old, Something
New, Something Borrowed, and Something Blue - Murray Hunter
Back to the future: Australia's "Pacific
Solution" reprise - Murray Hunter
Hillary to Julia "You take India and I'll take Pakistan", while an ex-Aussie
PM says "Enough is enough with the US" - Murray Hunter
Entrepreneurship and economic growth? South-East Asian
governments are developing policy on the misconception that entrepreneurship
creates economic growth. - Murray Hunter
FOCUSING ON MENACING MIDDLE EAST GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS,
ENDANGERING SECURITY AND STABILITY OF WESTERN BALKAN* - Brig Gen (Rtd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan, Pakistan
Australia "Do as I say, not as I do" - The ongoing RBA
bribery scandal - Murray Hunter
Australia in the "Asian Century" or is it Lost in Asia? - Murray Hunter
Surprise, surprise: An Islam economy can be innovative - Murray Hunter
Do Asian Management Paradigms Exist? A look at four theoretical frames - Murray
Hunter
What China wants in Asia: 1975 or 1908 ? – addendum - prof. dr. Anis
Bajraktarević
ASEAN Nations need indigenous innovation
to transform their economies but are doing little about it. - Murray Hunter
From Europe, to the US, Japan, and onto China: The evolution of the automobile -
Murray Hunter
Missed Opportunities for ASEAN if the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) fails to
start up in 2015 - Murray Hunter
Lessons from the Invention of the airplane and the Beginning of the Aviation Era
- Murray Hunter
Elite educators idolize the “ high flying entrepreneurs” while
deluded about the realities of entrepreneurship for the masses: -
Murray Hunter
The
Arrival of Petroleum, Rockefeller, and the Lessons He taught Us - Murray Hunter
- University Malaysia Perlis
Ethics, Sustainability and the New Realities - Murray Hunter
The Dominance of “Western” Management Theories in South-East Asian Business
Schools: The occidental colonization of the mind. - Murray Hunter
How feudalism
hinders community transformation and economic evolution: Isn’t equal opportunity
a basic human right? - Murray Hunter
On Some of the Misconceptions about Entrepreneurship - Murray Hunter
Knowledge, Understanding and the God Paradigm - Murray Hunter
Do Confucian Principled Businesses Exist in Asia? - Murray Hunter
Samsara and the
Organization - Murray Hunter
Integrating the philosophy of Tawhid – an Islamic approach to organization. -
Murray Hunter
What’s
with all the hype – a look at aspirational marketing - Murray Hunter
Does Intrapreneurship exist in Asia? - Murray Hunter
One Man, Multiple Inventions: The lessons and legacies of Thomas Edison -
Murray Hunter
People tend to start businesses for the wrong reasons - Murray Hunter
How
emotions influence, how we see the world? - Murray Hunter
How we create new ideas - Murray Hunter
Where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from? - Murray Hunter
The
five types of thinking we use - Murray Hunter
Evaluating Entrepreneurial Opportunities: What’s wrong with SWOT? - Murray
Hunter
How
motivation really works - Murray Hunter
The
Evolution of Business Strategy - Murray Hunter
Not all opportunities are the same: A look at the four types of
entrepreneurial opportunity -
Murray Hunter
Do we have a creative intelligence? - Murray Hunter
Imagination may be more important than knowledge: The eight types of imagination
we use - Murray Hunter
The environment as a multi-dimensional system:
Taking off your rose coloured
glasses
- Murray Hunter
Generational Attitudes and Behaviour -
Murray Hunter
Groupthink may still be a hazard to your organization - Murray Hunter
Perpetual Self conflict: Self awareness as a key to our ethical drive, personal mastery, and perception of
entrepreneurial opportunities - Murray Hunter
The Continuum of Psychotic Organisational Typologies - Murray Hunter
There is no such person as an entrepreneur, just a person who acts
entrepreneurially - Murray Hunter
Go Home, Occupy Movement!!-(The McFB– Was Ist Das?) - prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
Diplomatie préventive - Aucun siècle Asiatique sans l’institution pan-Asiatique - prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
Democide Mass-Murder
and the New World Order - Paul Adams
Crans Montana video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tN8tam1nRQ













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BALKAN AREA


prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic

Go Home, Occupy Movement!!
-
(The McFB – Was Ist Das?)
-
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

Diplomatie préventive - Aucun sičcle Asiatique sans l’institution pan-Asiatique
- prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic\/span|

ADDENDUM – GREEN/POLICY PAPER: TOWARDS THE CREATION OF THE OSCE TASK FORCE ON (THE FUTURE OF) HUMAN CAPITAL
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea – Chinese
strategic mistake
-
Anis H. Bajrektarevic

Geopolitics of Quantum Buddhism: Our Pre-Hydrocarbon Tao Future
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

The Mexico-held G–20 voices its concerns over the situation in the EURO zone
- Anis H. Bajrektarevic

What China wants in Asia: 1975 or 1908 ? – addendum - prof. dr. Anis
Bajraktarević

‘The exhaustion of Greek political system and a society in flames’ - by Dimitra
Karantzen


Maasmechelen Village


Maasmechelen Village

FOCUSING ON MENACING MIDDLE EAST GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS,
ENDANGERING SECURITY AND STABILITY OF WESTERN BALKAN* -
Brig Gen (Rtd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan, Pakistan

Institute for the research of genocide - IGC Letter Regarding Vuk Jeremic Agenda in UN

Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof.
Anis H. Bajrektarevic


From Europe, to the US, Japan, and onto China: The evolution of the
automobile - Murray Hunter

ASEAN Nations need indigenous innovation
to transform their economies but are doing little about it.
- Murray Hunter

Do Asian Management Paradigms Exist? A look at four theoretical frames -
Murray Hunter

Surprise, surprise: An Islam economy can be innovative - Murray Hunter

Australia in the "Asian Century" or is it Lost in Asia? - Murray Hunter

Australia "Do as I say, not as I do" - The ongoing RBA
bribery scandal - Murray Hunter

Entrepreneurship and economic growth? South-East Asian
governments are developing policy on the misconception that entrepreneurship
creates economic growth. - Murray Hunter

Hillary to Julia "You take India and I'll take Pakistan", while an ex-Aussie
PM says "Enough is enough with the US" -
Murray Hunter

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